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I. INTRODUCTION
At the age of five, Cesar Vargas came to the United States with his
family.1 Since then, Cesar has graduated with honors from both college and
law school despite lacking access to financial aid, legal employment, and a
driver’s license.2 Yet, after rating him a “stellar” candidate, the State
Supreme Court of New York recommended he not be admitted to the New
York bar because of his status as an undocumented noncitizen.3 Moreover,
under federal law, he would not be allowed to legally work in any field
because of his undocumented status.4 Like Cesar, young undocumented
noncitizens across the country have been unable to pursue their desired
careers, even if they manage to get the necessary education, because of their
lack of immigration status.5
Faced with congressional inaction, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
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(DACA) program in an effort to give young undocumented noncitizens like
Cesar the opportunity to contribute their skills and education to the American
community. Acknowledging that these young noncitizens “lacked the intent
to violate the law” when they were brought to the United States as children
and, in many instances, “know only this country as home,” Secretary of
Homeland Security Janet Napolitano directed the DHS, in exercise of its
prosecutorial discretion, to grant young undocumented noncitizens deferred
prosecutorial action and temporary work permits, provided they meet certain
standards.6
To date, DHS has granted DACA relief to over 521,825 young
immigrants who would not otherwise be able to legally work in the United
States.7 Yet, although DACA recipients enjoy federal work authorization,
states have adopted policies which restrict the benefits they receive from their
employment authorization and bar them from pursuing certain professions.
At least two states, Arizona and Nebraska, have refused to issue driver’s
licenses to DACA recipients.8 Moreover, there are cases currently on appeal
in at least two states, one of which is Cesar’s case in New York, where the
board of admissions to the state’s bar have denied bar admission to DACA
recipients because of their immigration status.9 These policies treat DACA
recipients differently from other noncitizens with temporary work permits
(nonimmigrants). Yet, it is still unclear what level of review courts should
apply to Equal Protection challenges arising from these policies because,
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although the DACA program effectively deems recipients lawfully present,10
it grants them no immigration status.11 Moreover, courts have not been
consistent in their review of equal protection challenges for different
categories of noncitizens.12 Thus, it is imperative that courts apply an
adequate level of protection to ensure that DACA recipients are not
discriminated against in a manner that would effectively abrogate the DACA
program’s purpose of allowing undocumented noncitizen youths the
opportunity to fully contribute to the American society.
This Comment will analyze why DACA recipients are entitled to
heightened scrutiny in equal protection claims by analyzing the different
levels of scrutiny applied to the various classifications of noncitizens and
how they provide guidance for an adequate standard of review for DACA
recipients. Section II of this Comment will provide an overview of judicial
decisions in Equal Protection challenges regarding various categories of
noncitizens. Section III will then argue that DACA recipients are entitled to
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
II. BACKGROUND
Under the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, states cannot “deny
any person within [their] jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”13 It
is well established that noncitizens are “persons” for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, entitled to Equal Protection rights.14
However, the level of protection afforded to a group depends on the nature
of the right involved and the group’s status as a suspect, semi-suspect, or
non-suspect class.15 In the case of noncitizens, courts have reached different
conclusions about their suspect classification and the applicable level of
scrutiny, based on their immigration status.16 This Section will discuss
judicial decisions on Equal Protection challenges involving different types of
10.
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Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II, 757 F.3d at 1059 (“DHS considers DACA recipients not to be unlawfully
present in the United States because their deferred action is a period of stay authorized by the
Attorney General.”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (2013); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(3) (2013);
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVS., ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL Ch.
40.9.2(b)(3)(J), available at http://www.uscis.gov/iframe/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-01.html).
Napolitano Memo, supra note 6 (acknowledging the DACA program “confers no substantive right,
immigration status or pathway to citizenship. Only the Congress, acting through its legislative
authority, can confer these rights.”).
See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); LeClerc v. Webb, 419
F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005); Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973) (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371
(1971); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238
(1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 857 (1998).
See, e.g., Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 729; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216, 223–24; LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 421–22.
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noncitizens. First, it will discuss the different levels of scrutiny the courts
apply in equal protection cases generally. Then, it will give an overview of
the various classifications of noncitizens under current immigration law.
Lastly, it will discuss how courts have applied different levels of scrutiny to
various classifications of noncitizens.
A. Judicial Application of the Equal Protection Clause
The judicial level of scrutiny applied to an Equal Protection challenge
depends on the classification of the challenging party and the nature of the
right affected.17 The Supreme Court has found claims involving certain
rights to be automatically subject to heightened scrutiny because of their
fundamental nature.18 Thus far, the Court has found that rights such as the
right to interstate travel,19 marry,20 procreate,21 and the right for a family to
live together22 are fundamental and, thus, entitled to strict scrutiny.
When a challenge does not involve a fundamental right, however, the
level of judicial review applicable depends on the classification of the injured
group.23 To determine the classification and whether the class is suspect or
likely to be discriminated against, courts look to whether there is a history of
discrimination against the class, the class shares immutable characteristics,
the class constitutes a discrete and insular minority, and whether the class’s
shared immutable characteristic has a bearing on its ability to contribute to
society.24
When the government action at issue involves disparate treatment of a
“suspect class” or a fundamental right, courts apply strict scrutiny, which
requires that the government narrowly tailor its action to further a compelling
government interest.25 The requirement that the government have a
compelling purpose in enacting a law that restricts a fundamental right or
treats a suspect class differently allows courts to ensure “that the legislative
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
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Id.
Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (applying strict scrutiny because the
state action at issue “involve[d] one of the basic civil rights of man”).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
Id.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (acknowledging that “freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life” is a fundamental right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational
relation to some legitimate end.”).
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 857 (1998).
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tool.”26 The narrow tailoring requirement, then, mandates that the action be
neither over-inclusive nor under-inclusive and, thus, ensures that the
government uses the least restrictive or discriminatory means of achieving
its compelling interest.27
When a challenge does not involve a fundamental right and the court
finds a classification to be “semi-suspect,” it will apply intermediate scrutiny,
which requires that the government action further an important government
interest and that the action be substantially related to that important interest.28
A classification will be semi-suspect when, although not immediately
suspect, it is entitled to heightened scrutiny based on the factors listed above.
Once a semi-suspect classification has been established, the requirement that
the state’s interest be an important one ensures that the government action is
not based on generalizations and stereotypes of the class.29 Moreover, by
requiring that the action be substantially related to the state’s important
purpose, courts ensure that the state action is more than rationally related to
the purpose but do not require that it be narrowly tailored.30
Lastly, when a court finds that a classification is not suspect and the
challenge does not involve a fundamental right, the court will apply rational
basis scrutiny, which requires only that the government action be rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.31 A legitimate end is one “within the
scope of the constitution.”32
B. Noncitizen Categories Under Current Immigration Law
Under current immigration law, noncitizens are divided into three major
categories: lawful permanent residents (LPRs), nonimmigrants, and
undocumented noncitizens. LPRs are noncitizens who have legal permits
allowing them to remain in the United States permanently.33 Nonimmigrants,
on the other hand, have only temporary permission to remain in the United
States.34 Nonimmigrants include noncitizens present in the United States as
“temporary workers, students, foreign diplomats, tourists, and business
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City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 857 (1998).
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976).
See Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981).
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.”).
Id.
Ariel Subourne, Alienage As A Suspect Class: Nonimmigrants and the Equal Protection Clause, 10
SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 199, 205 (2013).
Id.
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travelers.”35 Lastly, undocumented noncitizens are those who do not have
permission to be present in the United States either because they entered
illegally or because their permits have expired.36
C. Judicial Application of Equal Protection Standards of Review to
Noncitizens
The difficulty in determining the appropriate standards of review for
DACA recipients arises partly as a result of the patchwork of judicial
decisions applying different levels of scrutiny to different categories of
noncitizens. This Section describes that case law.
1. Lawful Permanent Residents and the Equal Protection Clause: In re
Griffiths37
In Griffiths, the Supreme Court analyzed Connecticut’s rule barring
noncitizens from the practice of law.38 Specifically, the Court reviewed
Connecticut’s bar examining committee’s decision to deny Griffiths, an LPR,
permission to take the state bar exam solely on the basis of her immigration
status.39
Acknowledging that “the right to work . . . is of the very essence of the
personal freedom and opportunity that was the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment to secure,”40 the Court began its analysis reiterating the wellsettled standing of alienage-based classifications as inherently suspect and,
as such, entitled to strict scrutiny.41 Subject to this standard of review, a state
35.

36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. (internal quotations omitted). This Comment will also refer to noncitizens granted deferred
action and/or temporary work authorization as nonimmigrants. Noncitizens granted deferred action
include DACA recipients, “individuals suffering serious medical conditions”[,] and “persons
temporarily prevented from returning to their home country due to a natural disaster, among others.”
CITIZEN AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. OMBUDSMAN, DEFERRED ACTION: RECOMMNEDATIONS TO
IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND CONSISTENCY IN THE USCIS PROCESS (2011), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cisomb-combined-dar.pdf.
Other noncitizens granted
temporary work authorization include refugees, asylees, trafficking victims granted T-visas,
domestic violence victims granted relief under the Violence Against Women Act, and victims of
other crimes granted U-visas. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR I-765, APPLICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION 1-6 (2013).
WASH. STATE DEP’T OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVS., CITIZENSHIP AND ALIEN STATUS
DEFINITIONS
(2014),
available
at
http://www.dshs.wa.gov/manuals/eaz/sections/
CitizenshipAndAlienStatus/citizengenelig.shtml (defining “undocumented aliens” as “noncitizens
without a lawful immigration status” who either “[e]ntered the U.S. illegally” or “[w]ere lawfully
admitted but whose status expired or was revoked per United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services.”).
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
Id. at 718.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 721.
Id. (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)).
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must show that its action is grounded on an interest that is “both
constitutionally permissible and substantial” and that the means, or
classification, it employs are necessary to accomplish or safeguard its
substantial interest.42
The Court found that Connecticut’s interest in ensuring that licensed
attorneys be qualified to practice law is substantial.43 However, this interest
did not justify barring noncitizens from the practice of law.44 In reaching its
decision, the Court found that, since the practice of law does not engage
governmental affairs, an attorney’s alienage does not contravene the interest
of the United States in such a manner that would require barring noncitizens
from law practice.45 Moreover, the Court reasoned that, although lawyers are
“officers of the court,” they are not officers “in the ordinary sense.”46 Rather,
lawyers are autonomous, private professionals who, although engaged in
court proceedings, are not agents of the government.47 Thus, the Court
concluded that Connecticut’s rule barring noncitizens from law practice was
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and established the strict
level of review applicable to noncitizens in Equal Protection challenges.
Since then, however, courts have found that the strict scrutiny applied in
Griffiths does not apply to all noncitizens.
2. Undocumented Noncitizens and the Equal Protection Clause: Plyler v.
Doe48
The most marked difference within the different categories of
noncitizens is between LPRs and undocumented noncitizens. In Plyler v.
Doe, the Supreme Court acknowledged this difference and analyzed its
implications regarding the standard of review applicable to Equal Protection
challenges.49 The Court reviewed a class action challenge brought by
undocumented children to the constitutionality of a Texas statute that
effectively denied them a public education by authorizing school districts to
deny enrollment to undocumented children and to withhold state funds for
their education to those school districts that did allow them to enroll.50
The Court began its analysis by rejecting the State’s argument that,
because of their undocumented status, the plaintiffs were not “persons within
its jurisdiction” and, therefore, not entitled to protection under the Fourteenth
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 721–22.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 728–29.
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 205–06.
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Amendment.51 First, the Court emphasized that, “[w]hatever his status under
the immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in the ordinary sense of
that term” and, consequently, for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.52
Further, the Court concluded, undocumented noncitizens are persons “within
[a State’s] jurisdiction” because Congress intended for that language to
guarantee “equal protection to all within a State’s boundaries,” regardless of
whether his or her “initial entry into [the] State, or into the United States, was
unlawful.”53
Having established that undocumented noncitizens are protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court was faced with establishing a proper
standard of review for this class. The Court concluded that, unlike LPRs,
undocumented noncitizens “cannot be treated as a suspect class because their
presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional
irrelevancy.’”54 Moreover, the Court found that public education, although
of upmost importance to society, is not a fundamental right.55 Based on these
findings, the Court concluded that undocumented noncitizens, even in the
education context, are only entitled to rational basis review in Equal
Protection challenges.56
The Court acknowledged, however, that undocumented minors, who
are unable to affect “[]either their parents’ conduct []or their own status,” are
not comparably situated to undocumented adults who violated immigration
laws of their own accord and have the ability to return to their home
countries.57 Because of this, courts may take into account the “costs to the
Nation and to the innocent children” when determining the rationality of a
state action and afford them a higher level of scrutiny than that applied to
undocumented noncitizens generally.58 Here, the Court found that barring
undocumented children from public education would contravene the goal of
the Equal Protection Clause to prevent unreasonable government-imposed
“obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit”59 and impose “a
lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their
disabling status.”60 Thus, the Court concluded, the state action can “hardly
be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal.”61

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 210.
Id.
Id. at 214–15.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 222–23.
See id. at 216, 223–24.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 223–24.
Id. at 221–22.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
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By requiring that the state action be rationally related to a substantial
state purpose, the Court established a higher standard of review for
undocumented minors in the education context than the rational basis review
applicable to undocumented noncitizens in general. This standard of review
requires that the state action be rationally related to a legitimate, rather than
substantial, end. Yet, even this more nuanced review of noncitizens’
protection under the Equal Protection Clause failed to encompass the entire
spectrum of noncitizen classifications and left the door open for courts to
apply a different standard of review to those noncitizens who, although
lawfully present, lack permanent resident status.
3. Nonimmigrants and the Equal Protection Clause: A Split Approach
Currently, federal circuit courts are split as to the standard of review
applicable to nonimmigrants in Equal Protection cases. On one side, the
Appellate Courts for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have found that
nonimmigrants are only entitled to rational basis review. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, has held that nonimmigrants are entitled to strict
scrutiny.
a. Rational Basis Review: LeClerc v. Webb62
In LeClerc, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed an Equal
Protection challenge to a Louisiana Supreme Court Rule that required an
applicant for admission to the state bar to be either a U.S. citizen or LPR.63
Here, the court began by acknowledging the Supreme Court’s rationale for
applying strict scrutiny to LPRs, their inability to affect the political process
in favor of their interests and their similarities to United States citizens.64 The
court found, however, that because of the temporary nature of their status,
nonimmigrants need not be considered a suspect class.65
Moreover, the court distinguished nonimmigrants from Plyler and the
heightened standard of review afforded to undocumented minors there.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Plyler, the court reasoned, the nonimmigrant plaintiffs
in this case “entered this country voluntarily and with an understanding of
their limited, temporary status.”66 Thus, the unfair consequences which
moved the court to grant heightened scrutiny to undocumented minors were
not present here.67 As a result, the court applied rational basis scrutiny and
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 410.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 417–18.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 420–21.
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found the Louisiana Supreme Court Rule constitutional as it is rationally
related to the legitimate state purpose of regulating the practice of law.68
Since LeClerc, at least one other circuit court has borrowed the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning to find that nonimmigrants are entitled only to rational basis
review.69
b. Dandamudi v.Tisch70
In Dandamudi, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the
constitutionality of a New York statute requiring U.S. citizenship or legal
permanent residence to obtain a pharmacist’s license.71 The court began its
opinion acknowledging that, although most nonimmigrants are required to
establish their lack of intent to permanently stay in the United States to obtain
their nonimmigrant visas, both the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and
the State Department recognize the “doctrine of dual intent, which allows
aliens to express an intention to remain in the United States temporarily . . .
while also intending to remain permanently.”72
Further, the court restated the Supreme Court holdings that “alienage is
a suspect classification” and that, when a state action “interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a
suspect class,” it must be subject to strict scrutiny.73 Moreover, the court here
found that the Supreme Court has established only two exceptions to the view
that alienage is a suspect class.74 One exception allows for state exclusion of
noncitizens from “political and governmental functions.”75 The other
exception allows for courts to apply rational basis review to challenges
involving undocumented noncitizens.76 Thus, the court found that the
Supreme Court has not made any exceptions or distinctions between lawfully
present noncitizens.77 Accordingly, the Second Circuit Court refused to
carve out a third exception and held that nonimmigrants, like LPRs, are a
suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny.78
In reaching its decision, the court declined to follow LeClerc and
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen’s
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 421–22.
See League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2007)
(adopting LeClerc’s reasoning to find that strict scrutiny only applies to LPRs).
686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 69 (citing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6805(1)(6) (McKinney 2014)).
Id. at 70.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 73.
Id. (citing Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1978) (applying rational basis review and
upholding a statute prohibiting noncitizens to work as police officers)).
Id. at 74 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 (1982); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)).
Id.
Id. at 79.
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assumption that, because nonimmigrants have only temporary interests in the
United States, they are not on equal footing with LPRs. First, the court
reasoned that this finding would be fundamentally inconsistent with the BIA
and State Department’s doctrine of dual intent.79 Further, the court
concluded that the Supreme Court recognizes noncitizens as a suspect class
not because of their similarities to United States citizens or their obligations
to the country but because of their vulnerable status as a discrete and insular
minority unable to affect the political process.80 In fact, the court found that
nonimmigrants are “more powerless and vulnerable” than their LPR
counterparts.81
Lastly, the court concluded, applying rational basis scrutiny to
nonimmigrants would create “absurd results” because it would effectively
afford less protection to lawfully present nonimmigrants than that afforded
to undocumented minors in Plyler.82 This analysis, however, becomes more
complex in the case of DACA recipients who, although lawfully present,
unlawfully entered the country and have been granted no immigration status.
4. DACA Recipients and the Equal Protection Clause: Arizona Dream Act
Coalition v. Brewer83
To date, Arizona Dream Act Coalition is the only decision regarding an
Equal Protection challenge to a state action discriminating against DACA
recipients. The Arizona Dream Act Coalition, a youth-led immigration
advocacy group, along with a number of DACA recipients, brought suit
against the State of Arizona challenging the constitutionality of its policy to
deny driver’s licenses to DACA recipients.84 The Plaintiffs asked the District
Court of Arizona for a preliminary injunction barring the State of Arizona
from continuing its policy.85 Although the District Court of Arizona denied
the preliminary injunction, on appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, granting Plaintiffs’
motion for preliminary injunction.86 Since this was the first time a federal
district and appellate court spoke on the issue of which standard of review
should be applied to DACA recipients, it is an interesting preview of what
the District Court of Arizona will ultimately hold on the issue and what other
courts may decide.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 77.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 78.
Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014).
Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer (Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I), 945 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1052 (D. Ariz.
2013).
Id. at 1053.
Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II, 757 F.3d at 1075.
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After the DACA program came into effect, Arizona Governor Jan
Brewer issued an executive order barring DACA recipients “from obtaining
eligibility, beyond those available to any person regardless of lawful status,
for any taxpayer-funded public benefits and state identification, including a
driver’s license.”87 As a result, DACA recipients, who receive employment
authorization documents (EADs) as part of the DACA program, would be
denied driver’s licenses in Arizona while other EAD-holding noncitizens
would be allowed to continue to receive driver’s licenses.88 Thus, the court
found that DACA recipients were similarly situated to other EAD holders,
despite the differences in deferred action programs, yet treated differently.89
Having established the existence of disparate treatment, the court then
analyzed the level of scrutiny applicable under the Equal Protection analysis.
First, the court analyzed whether Plaintiffs are entitled to strict scrutiny. In
so doing, the court looked at Supreme Court decisions, finding that the
Supreme Court’s rationale in holding alienage as a suspect class was
grounded on the “similarities between legal resident aliens and citizens” such
as the fact that LPRs pay taxes, may be drafted into the army, and may live,
work, and contribute to the economy of a state for an extended period of
time.90 Thus, based on Plaintiffs’ dissimilarities to United States citizens, the
court decided to follow the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ decisions in LULAC and
LeClerc to conclude that Plaintiffs are not entitled to strict scrutiny.91
Having rejected strict scrutiny, the court then analyzed whether
Plaintiffs are entitled to intermediate scrutiny. First, the court acknowledged
intermediate scrutiny may apply to “plaintiffs who (1) have suffered a history
of discrimination; (2) exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
characteristics that define them as a distinct group; and (3) show that they are
a minority or politically powerless.”92 The court concluded, however, that
because of the recency of the DACA program, Plaintiffs cannot establish they
have suffered a history of discrimination.93 Moreover, the court noted, the
DACA program itself disproves Plaintiffs’ political powerlessness since it
shows that they “have attracted the attention of policymakers in the federal
government.”94
Next, the court looked at the “hybrid form of review” applied to
undocumented minors in Plyler to decide whether it may apply to Plaintiffs
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Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 1055.
Id. at 1060 (noncitizens may receive EADs as part of other deferred action programs).
Id. at 1062 (“[a]ll deferred action recipients are permitted to remain in the country without removal
for a temporary period of time”).
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1065.
Id.
Id. at 1066.
Id.
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here.95 In doing so, the court pointed to two facts that justified the heightened
scrutiny in Plyler: “(1) the age of the undocumented children . . . , and (2) the
importance of education to those children and the entire nation.”96 Based on
those facts, the court found that Plaintiffs here are not entitled to hybrid
heightened scrutiny because they are not minor children and driver’s licenses
do not have the same importance to Plaintiffs and the nation as primary
education since they are not “the basic tools by which individuals might lead
economically productive lives to the benefit of us all.”97
Thus, the court concluded that Plaintiffs are not a suspect or quasisuspect class and are, therefore, only entitled to rational basis review.98 In
reviewing the likelihood of success of Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection challenge
to Arizona’s policy, the court acknowledged the statements of Governor
Brewer regarding the DACA program, which point to her motives for issuing
the executive order barring DACA recipients from driver’s licenses.99 Then
the court concluded that, although Governor Brewer is entitled to disagree
with the federal government, she lacked a rational basis for issuing the
executive order.100 Therefore, based on this preliminary analysis, the court
found that Arizona’s policy is likely to fail a rational basis review.101 The
court, however, ultimately denied Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary
injunction on the basis that Plaintiffs are unlikely to suffer irreparable
harm.102
After the district court’s finding that Arizona’s policy was likely to fail
even under a rational basis standard, Arizona revised its discriminatory
policy in an effort to survive this most deferential test. To pass constitutional
muster, Arizona decided to simply widen their net of discrimination, refusing
driver’s licenses to other deferred action recipients.103
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit framed Plaintiffs’
claim narrowly, finding that DACA recipients are “similarly situated to other
categories of noncitizens who may use Employment Authorization
Documents to obtain driver’s licenses in Arizona.”104 Based on this framing,
the court concluded that, because Arizona’s policy denies driver’s licenses to
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Id.; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) (requiring that the state action be rationally related to
a substantial state goal).
Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1070 (“The Governor strongly criticized the program as ‘back door amnesty’ and political
‘pandering’ . . . and her comments show that she disagreed with the federal government’s
conclusion that DACA recipients are now authorized by federal law to be present in the country
referring to them as ‘illegal people.’”).
Id. at 1071–72.
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1074.
See Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II, 757 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1064.
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some categories of EAD holders, the policy treats DACA recipients
disparately.105 Having concluded that Arizona’s policy discriminates against
DACA recipients, the court found that it did not need to “decide what
standard of scrutiny applies to Defendants’ policy: as the district court
concluded, Defendants’ policy is likely to fail even rational basis review.”106
Yet, the court acknowledged the long-standing principle that alienage is a
suspect classification only subject to rational basis review when the persons
targeted by the discriminatory actions are unlawfully present in the
country.107 Ultimately, Arizona Dream Act Coalition illustrates both the
difficulty in establishing an appropriate level of scrutiny for DACA
recipients and the importance to do so.
III. ANALYSIS
Based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Griffiths and Plyler, DACA
recipients’ Equal Protection challenges should be afforded heightened
scrutiny. This Section will first analyze why DACA recipients and other
lawfully present noncitizens should be afforded strict scrutiny. In the
alternative, it will argue that DACA recipients should be afforded
intermediate scrutiny. Lastly, this Section will argue that, at a minimum,
DACA recipients should be afforded Plyler’s heightened scrutiny.
A. DACA Recipients Are Entitled to Strict Scrutiny
It is well-established that alienage is a suspect classification for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.108 This principle has not been
abandoned or redefined.109 Although some courts have decided that
nonimmigrants are only entitled to rational basis scrutiny,110 that reasoning
is flawed.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1065.
107. Id. at 1065 n. 4 (“Though we need not decide what standard of scrutiny to apply here, we note that
the Supreme Court has consistently required the application of strict scrutiny to state action that
discriminates against noncitizens authorized to be present in the United States. Conversely,
alienage-based discrimination is subject to rational basis review only when the aliens targeted by
that discrimination are “presen[t] in this country in violation of federal law.”) (internal citation
omitted).
108. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (equating classifications based on alienage to
other immediately suspect classifications such as race and nationality and finding that “[a]liens as
a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular minority . . . for whom [strict scrutiny] is
appropriate.”).
109. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (distinguishing undocumented noncitizens from
noncitizens in general only because of their unlawful presence).
110. See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 421 (5th Cir. 2005); League of United Latin Am. Citizens
(LULAC) v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I, 945 F.
Supp. 2d 1049, 1050 (D. Ariz. 2013).
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First, the decisions holding that nonimmigrants are only entitled to
rational basis scrutiny misinterpret the Supreme Court’s holding in Plyler.
Those decisions are based on the notion that, in Plyler, the Supreme Court
established that alienage only entitles a group of noncitizens to suspect class
status when the group involves LPRs.111 This is a misreading because the
Court did not hold that some types of alienage are suspect and others are not.
Instead, the Court carved out a narrow exception for undocumented
noncitizens based solely on their unlawful presence.112
Nowhere in its decisions does the Supreme Court create a sliding scale
of protection for noncitizens based on their immigration status. The only
relevant factors are those which the Court has consistently used in
determining whether a class is suspect, the history of discrimination against
the class, shared immutable characteristics among members of the class, the
class’s status as a discrete and insular minority, and whether the class’s
shared immutable characteristics have a barring in its ability to contribute to
society.113 Based on these factors, even undocumented noncitizens would be
a suspect class but for their unlawful presence.114 It follows, then, that in
reviewing an equal protection challenge involving DACA recipients, who are
effectively deemed lawfully present in the United States, a court must apply
strict scrutiny.
Further, the decisions in LeClerc and LULAC erroneously focus on the
dissimilarities between lawfully present noncitizens and the undocumented
noncitizens in Plyler.115 In Plyler, the Court highlighted the importance of
education both to the noncitizen minors and to the American society.116
While it is true that the policy considerations that led the Supreme Court to
apply a heightened level of scrutiny in Plyler are not present in the cases
involving nonimmigrants,117 this is irrelevant because alienage in itself
entitles a class to strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court in Plyler did not
establish those policy considerations as factors for finding a noncitizen
classification suspect. Rather, it used them only after finding that the
111. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 419 (“[A]lthough aliens are a suspect class in general, they are not
homogeneous and precedent does not support the proposition that nonimmigrant aliens are a suspect
class entitled to . . . strict scrutiny.”).
112. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223; Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II, 757 F.3d 1053, 1065 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“Though we need not decide what standard of scrutiny to apply here, we note that the Supreme
Court has consistently required the application of strict scrutiny to state action that discriminates
against noncitizens authorized to be present in the United States. Conversely, alienage-based
discrimination is subject to rational basis review only when the aliens targeted by that
discrimination are present in this country in violation of federal law.”) (internal citations omitted).
113. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
114. Id.
115. See LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 418-19; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC), 500 F.3d
at 533 (adopting LeClerc’s rationale).
116. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220-23.
117. Id. (acknowledging the importance of education and finding that undocumented minors are not
similarly situated to undocumented adults because they did not willingly violate immigration law).
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plaintiffs’ unlawful presence barred them from suspect status.118 Thus, where
a noncitizen’s presence in the United States is lawful, a court need not engage
in an analysis of Plyler’s policy considerations because alienage, in itself, is
a suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny.
Moreover, courts applying rational basis erroneously engaged in a
similarity analysis to find that nonimmigrants are not a suspect class. In
Arizona Dream Act Coalition I, the Arizona District Court followed the
reasoning of LeClerc to find that, because nonimmigrants do not pay taxes,
may be drafted into the army, or live, work, and contribute to the economy
of a state for an extended period of time, they are not entitled to the same
strict scrutiny as LPRs.119 That is, the court found that, unlike LPRs who are
sufficiently similar to United States citizens, nonimmigrants are not and,
therefore, cannot be said to be considered a suspect class. This reasoning
disregards the long-standing principle that alienage, not lawful permanent
residence, is a suspect classification. In finding alienage suspect, the
Supreme Court did not engage in a similarity analysis. It looked at factors
such as the political powerlessness of aliens and their standing as a discrete
and insular minority.120
Alienage, in itself, is a suspect classification because all the relevant
factors point to its vulnerability.121 None of those factors, however, require
that the class share characteristics with a non-targeted group. Rather, they
emphasize the differences between a “discrete and insular” minority from the
majority. To require that a targeted minority be like a majority of the people
in society in order to be protected from discrimination would contravene the
very purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, which seeks to protect
disenfranchised minorities from the tyranny of the majority. Therefore,
DACA recipients, like other lawfully present noncitizens, are entitled to strict
scrutiny regardless of Plyler considerations or their dissimilarities with
United States citizens.
B. DACA Recipients, if Not Suspect, Are Entitled to Intermediate Scrutiny
Even if a court were to find that certain classes of lawfully present
noncitizens are not entitled to suspect classification, it would still be required
to apply intermediate scrutiny. When a class is not immediately suspect, a
court must look at “(1) the history of invidious discrimination against the
class; (2) whether the characteristics that distinguish the class [affect its
members’] ability to contribute to society; (3) whether the distinguishing
characteristic is “immutable” or beyond the class members’ control; and (4)
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 223.
Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1062 (D. Ariz. 2013).
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
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the political power of the subject class”122 to determine whether the class is
entitled to heightened scrutiny. In applying these factors, a court must find
that DACA recipients are entitled to intermediate scrutiny.
First, DACA recipients share the immutable characteristics of having
been brought to the United States as children and living in the United States
in violation of immigration laws. Although they may someday gain lawful
status, their upbringing will remain unchanged. These are young people who,
because of their upbringing as undocumented noncitizens, have not had the
same opportunities as their lawfully present counterparts. In many states,
they lacked the opportunity to attend college at in-state tuition rates and, in
the few states which extend in-state tuition benefits, they still lacked access
to federal financial aid, student loans, and legal employment to help defray
the costs of their education.123 Although the DACA program now allows
them access to lawful employment and they may someday gain an
immigration status through congressional action, this will not change the
psychological scars and loss of opportunities that their undocumented
upbringing will leave behind.
Further, they share a characteristic that is beyond their control because,
under current immigration laws, they do not have a path to citizenship and,
thus, cannot control their status as noncitizens. However, this shared and
immutable characteristic does not bear on their ability to contribute to
society, especially after receiving a work permit as a result of DACA. The
policies that seek to curtail their DACA benefits do, however, affect their
ability to contribute to society by denying them state benefits such as
professional and driver’s licenses. Thus, the first two factors point to DACA
recipients being entitled to heightened scrutiny.
Moreover, a court need only look at long standing history as well as the
more recent horde of anti-immigrant legislation to find a history of
discrimination of noncitizens. Throughout the country, state and local
governments have enacted legislation seeking to force undocumented
noncitizens out of their jurisdiction.124 Many of these laws have been found
122. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 857 (1998).
123. Undocumented Student Tuition: Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 5,
2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/undocumented-student-tuition-overview.aspx.
Currently, three states explicitly prohibit undocumented students from paying in-state tuition;
seventeen states allow undocumented students to qualify for in-state tuition; and five states, all of
which extend in-state tuition to undocumented students, also allow them to receive state financial
aid.
Id.
See
also
Advising
Undocumented
Students,
COLLEGE
BOARD,
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/guidance/financial-aid/undocumented-students (last visited
Apr. 16, 2014) (undocumented students do not qualify for federal financial aid, state financial aid
in most states, or most private scholarships).
124. Heidi Beirich, Essay: The Anti-Immigrant Movement, S. POVERTY LAW CTR.,
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/anti-immigrant/the-antiimmigrant-movement (last visited Apr. 16, 2014); see, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492 (2012) (upholding Arizona law which allows state police to detain anyone they have a
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unconstitutional. Based on the repeated unconstitutional and discriminatory
action of state and local governments, it is clear that noncitizens should be
found to be a suspect class.
Lastly, DACA recipients continue to lack access to the political process
and remain powerless. First, noncitizens are ineligible to vote in federal
elections and are overwhelmingly excluded from voting at the state and local
level.125 Thus, they have no direct access to the political process. Further
proof of their powerlessness is the continued failure of the DREAM Act in
Congress as well as Congress’s lack of action regarding the enactment of a
comprehensive immigration reform bill, despite immigrant activism.126 The
court in Arizona Dream Act Coalition found that the DACA program itself
is proof that noncitizens, particularly DREAMers, have a strong influence on
the political process.127 In fact, however, the DACA program was started to
ameliorate Congressional inaction. It, in no way, replaces the Congressional
action for which DREAMers have been advocating. By providing them with
only two-year temporary work permits, the DACA program provides only a
short-term solution and effectively leaves DACA recipients at the mercy of
changing political environments and executive administrations. Thus, courts
should find that, based on a factor analysis, DACA recipients are entitled to
intermediate scrutiny. Yet, even if a court were to disagree, DACA recipients
are still entitled to some kind of heightened scrutiny.
C. DACA Recipients Are, at Minimum, Entitled to Plyler’s Heightened
Scrutiny
In Plyler, the Supreme Court applied a heightened rational basis
scrutiny to undocumented minors finding that, although their unlawful
presence precluded them from suspect status, it is in the best interest of the
United States to grant them heightened protection in the education context.128

125.
126.

127.
128.

“reasonable suspicion” to believe is unlawfully present in the country); Ga. Latino Alliance for
Human Rights v. Deal, 691 F.3d 1250, 1268 (11th Cir. 2012) (denying preliminary injunction of
Georgia law similar to Arizona’s); Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of Ala., 691 F.3d
1236, 1245–46 (concluding that a section of Alabama law requiring verification of citizenship and
immigration status of enrolling students was subject to heightened scrutiny and holding that the
section violated the Equal Protection clause); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir.
2013) (striking down anti-immigrant housing and employment ordinances).
See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical
Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391 (1993).
Herszenhorn, supra note 4; Wesley Lowery, House Democrats Need 27 Signatures to Force Vote
on Comprehensive Immigration Reform Bill, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2014, 12:09 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/04/15/house-democrats-need-27signatures-to-force-vote-on-comprehensive-immigration-reform-bill/.
Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1066 (D. Ariz. 2013).
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220–23 (1982).
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Based on the Court’s rationale in that case, DACA recipients are entitled to
the same heightened rational basis scrutiny.
First, the plaintiffs Plyler sought to protect are the very same group who
now benefit from DACA. It is not a great leap to imagine the same kind of
undocumented children whose public school attendance Plyler sought to
protect growing up, graduating high school or serving in the United States
armed forces, and now being eligible for DACA relief. Having protected
their access to public education as children in the interest of the country, it
would now be inconsistent to curb their ability to contribute the skills and
education they have gained in the United States back to the community.
Moreover, like the plaintiffs in Plyler, DACA recipients had no intent
to violate immigration law when their families brought them to the United
States as children. Some younger DACA recipients may not even have any
accumulated unlawful presence129 and the rest, although unlawfully present
at some point, are now effectively deemed lawfully present in the country for
the duration of their work authorization.130 Thus, DACA recipients share the
same factors that led the Court to apply heightened scrutiny in Plyler.
Although most DACA recipients are now adults and could, thus, be said
to be able to change their condition as undocumented noncitizens unlike the
children in Plyler, it is unreasonable to expect them to do so. These young
people were brought to the United States as children. Since then, they have
grown to know only the United States as their home.131 They have grown up
American in almost every sense; they have attended the same schools, played
the same sports, listened to the same music, and shared in the same culture
as every other American child. But for the actions of their parents and
inaction of Congress, they are American. To hold that they are entitled to
less scrutiny simply because they grew up is unreasonable.
Ultimately, it is important to afford DACA recipients, and all lawfully
present noncitizens, heightened scrutiny because failing to do so would allow
a legislature to simply widen their net of discrimination to survive rational
basis review. In Arizona Dream Act Coalition, where the court applied
rational basis review to Arizona’s denial of driver’s licenses to DACA
recipients, the court advised that Arizona could continue to deny driver’s
129. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii-iii) (2013) (“[A]n alien is deemed to be unlawfully present in the
United States if the alien is present in the United States after the expiration of the [authorized]
period of stay . . . or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” However,
“[n]o period of time in which an alien is under 18 years of age shall be taken into account in
determining the period of unlawful presence in the United States.”).
130. See Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 (“[N]othing about [DACA] suggests that
DACA recipients are somehow less authorized to be present in the United States than are other
deferred action recipients . . . All deferred action recipients are permitted to remain in the country
without removal for a temporary period of time, and the EADs held by those recipients appear to
be valid only for a temporary period.”).
131. See Napolitano Memo, supra note 6.
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licenses to DACA recipients only if it also denies them to other deferred
actions recipients.132 That piece of judicial guidance may have seemed farfetched at the time of the decision. After all, it was difficult to imagine that
a state would deny driver’s licenses to deferred action recipients, such as
asylees and victims of domestic violence and human trafficking, just because
it disagreed with the DACA program.133 Yet, that is exactly what happened
in Arizona. After the district court indicated that, even under rational basis
scrutiny, Arizona’s policy was likely to be found discriminatory, Governor
Brewer decided to follow the court’s guidance and deny driver’s licenses to
all deferred action recipients.134
While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately found that even
this revised policy is not likely to survive the most deferential standard of
review, it did so employing a very narrow framing of the issue. That is, the
court found the Arizona policy treated DACA recipients disparately from
other EAD holders.135 The danger in this approach, however, is that it
provides an incentive for states to simply widen their net of discrimination to
pass constitutional muster. Therefore, to effectively protect DACA
recipients and other noncitizens from discriminatory state practices courts
must acknowledge alienage, whatever its type, as a suspect class and afford
all lawfully present noncitizens an appropriately heightened level of scrutiny.
IV. CONCLUSION
Alienage classifications, regardless of the type of lawfully present
noncitizens at issue, are immediately suspect. Therefore, courts should apply
strict scrutiny. In the alternative, courts should find that DACA recipients
are a discrete and insular minority entitled to intermediate scrutiny. Lastly,
even if a court refuses to apply either of those standards of review, DACA
recipients are, at a minimum, entitled to a lesser, heightened scrutiny above
rational basis. For the foregoing reasons, Equal Protection challenges
involving DACA recipients are entitled to heightened scrutiny.

132. Id.
133. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR
I-765, APPLICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION 1, 4–5 (2013) (listing asylees, DACA
recipients, human trafficking victims granted T-visas, crime victims granted U-visas, and domestic
violence victims granted VAWA relief as eligible for EADs).
134. David Knowles, Arizona Expands Ban on Undocumented Immigrant Driver’s Licenses to Include
Victims of Domestic Violence and Human Trafficking, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 18, 2013, 6:55
PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/arizona-tightens-immigrant-driver-licenserestrictions-article-1.1460313.
135. Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II, 757 F.3d 1053, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014).

